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Dynamics of Niche Width and Resource
Partitioning1
Stanislav D. Dobrev
University of Chicago
Tai-Young Kim
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Michael T. Hannan
Stanford University
This article examines the effects of crowding in a market center on
rates of change in organizational niche width and on organizational
mortality. It proposes that, although firms with wide niches benefit
from risk spreading and economies of scale, they are simultaneously
exposed to intense competition. An analysis of organizational dy-
namics in automobile manufacturing firms in France, Germany, and
Great Britain shows that competitive pressure not only increases
the hazard of disbanding but also prompts organizational transfor-
mations that give rise to processes of resource partitioning. Em-
phasizing the content/process distinction in conceptualizing organ-
izational change, the article finds that the process effect of changes
in niche width and position increases mortality hazards. We discuss
our findings in light of the processes investigated by the ecological
theories of density dependence, resource partitioning, and structural
inertia, and point to the theoretical links that help to integrate these
theories.
INTRODUCTION
This article investigates processes at the intersection of density-dependent
evolution and resource partitioning. In particular, it examines the effects
1 This research was supported by the University of Chicago Graduate School of Busi-
ness and by the Stanford Graduate School of Business. This is part of a collaborative
project with Glenn R. Carroll. We are indebted to our teammates Joon Han and John
Torres for helping us code and analyze the data. We also thank Glenn Carroll, John
Freeman, Richard Harrison, Susan Olzak, Joel Podolny, Jesper Sørensen, Ezra Zuck-
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of crowding in the center of a market on rates of change in organizational
niche width and on organizational mortality.
Consider a product market defined in terms of a single dimension—
engine capacity of automobiles in our empirical application. Producers
locate themselves in such a market by choosing an array of products.
Specialists offer products with a small range of variation on the dimension
of interest, and generalists display a broad range of products. In addition
to choosing a range (niche width), each producer also chooses a location,
which we identify as the center of its product range. Specialists have great
freedom in choice of location; they can locate in the center or toward
either periphery (above and below the center). Generalists face more con-
straint in choice of location because a wide niche covers much of the
market; yet, they can still choose whether to locate the center of their
range near the center of the market or toward one of the peripheries.
The emergence of a center in a market with many producers means
that consumer preferences have become concentrated on a relatively nar-
row range. The concentration of consumers at a center has two conse-
quences. First, producers who gain leadership in the center can grow very
large, and often they can exploit economies of scale. Second, the attrac-
tiveness of the center intensifies competition in the center (at least initially),
as many producers seek to match their products with consumer
preferences.
How does crowding in the center affect the organizations in a market?
According to density-dependence theory (and, especially, its generaliza-
tions to localized-density models), crowding intensifies competition, which,
in turn, elevates mortality hazards. This theory posits that crowding in-
creases the mortality hazards of organizations located in the center. Such
an effect should be especially pronounced for specialists located in the
center, who have nowhere to hide. In contrast, generalists whose niches
span the center can potentially offset some of the deleterious effects of
crowding in the center with success in less competitive regions covered
by their wide niches.
Technological niches, though subject to strong inertial pressures, are
not fixed. Crowding arguably induces organizations in the center to try
to modify their niches. Obviously, this can mean change in niche width
or change in niche position. So, for instance, specialists in the center might
stay specialized but may move to a peripheral position or broaden their
niches without changing the centers of their niches.
erman, and the AJS reviewers for helpful comments. Earlier drafts of the paper ben-
efited from presentations at the 2000 ASA meeting in Washington, D.C., and at the
Tulane Sociology Department. Direct correspondence to Stanislav Dobrev, Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, Illinois
60637.
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If change in a technological niche requires fundamental reorganization,
then such change increases the risk of mortality, at least in the short run.
So, crowding has a possible indirect effect on organizational mortality by
stimulating changes that heighten the risk of mortality.
Because the effects of crowding on mortality and the risks due to
changes stimulated by crowding depend upon an organization’s position
and niche width, the processes involved arguably can give rise to market
partitioning. For instance, resource-partitioning theory (Carroll 1985; Car-
roll and Swaminathan 2000; Dobrev 2000) assumes that, if generalists are
present in the center, then specialists can thrive only in the peripheries.
This is an obvious potential consequence of the microprocesses described
above. However, these processes can produce other patterns as well.2
We examine these issues in the context of the automobile industries of
France, Germany, and Great Britain. The automobile industry has a ma-
jor advantage for study of the dynamics of crowding and resource par-
titioning: specialism and small size can be clearly distinguished. This
matters because some recent research on partitioning processes treats spe-
cialization as equivalent to small size (Boone, Bro¨cheler, and Carroll 2000).
Although specialists tend to be small in some industries, there is no in-
herent connection between size and specialism. Given the current state
of empirical knowledge, it is important to distinguish the effects of size
from those of specialism, as our empirical setting allows. In the automobile
industry, some specialists have grown very large. Indeed, no firm has so
thoroughly dominated the world automobile industry as Ford in its heyday
in which it offered a single model, the Model T.3 Examples of dominant
firms with very narrow niches in European automobile industries include
the Great Horseless Carriage Company in the 1890s, Adam Opel in the
1920s, Volkswagen in the 1950s and 1960s, and Renault in the 1960s.
NICHE WIDTH, POSITION, AND LIFE CHANCES
A fundamental sociological insight holds that opportunities and con-
straints are inextricably linked to actors’ locations in a social structure.
The concept of organizational niche builds on this view. A niche sum-
marizes the ways in which social action (collective and individual) hinges
2 It is worth noting that the possibility that small niches suitable for specialists can
persist in the center as a consequence of the geometry of sphere packing (Pe´li and
Nooteboom 1999) does not apply to the case we consider. The niches we consider are
one dimensional; the densest packing is complete in this case.
3 Various versions of the Model T, with only one engine offered at any one time,
garnered sales of over 15 million cars during 1908–27. For some of this period, Ford
controlled over half of the world market for automobiles.
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on the position of focal actors in a social space.4 Our focus on organi-
zational niches stems from our desire to understand how an organization’s
position in an industry shapes its life chances. An analysis of niches allows
us to understand the behavior of organizations as it reflects the competitive
and symbiotic dynamics of interaction within a particular market segment.
Niche width refers to an entity’s variance in resource utilization (Han-
nan and Freeman 1989). This representation proves useful for classifying
organizations in terms of generalist (wide niche) and specialist (narrow
niche) competitive strategies. Claimed benefits of specialism (or general-
ism) for organizational performance have received much attention. Con-
ventional strategic analysis builds on an especially simple notion—for
firms to grow, expand, and increase profitability, they must diversify
(Chandler 1962; Steiner 1964). Entry into new markets, products, or serv-
ices not only allows the firm to tap potentially unexplored resources, but
also reduces risk by spreading it over several operational domains. Ad-
ditionally, diversification generates economies of scale and scope across
similar functions in the separate lines of business (Paine and Anderson
1983). Thus, generalism is not merely a desirable state; it stands as a
requisite for successful organizational performance on this view.
The purported advantages of a generalist strategy underestimate the
importance of the timing in the industry evolution, fluctuation in resource
flows, market concentration, and distributions of organizational size and
age. Environmental processes have been emphasized in the work on or-
ganizational niche theory (Freeman and Hannan 1983; Hannan and Free-
man 1989; Pe´li 1997). This theory specifies the configuration of environ-
mental conditions under which the generalist strategy conveys advantage.
In particular, the theory posits that generalists are favored when envi-
ronmental variation is high and the pattern of variation is coarse. Our
reading of the history of the industry suggests that changes in technology
and in consumer tastes have been highly uncertain over the history of
the industry and that changes have occurred irregularly over time. In
other words, we think that variations in key environments of this industry
have been highly uncertain and coarse grained. Our hypothesis about the
main effect of niche width on mortality hazards is based upon this as-
sumption. That is, in the case of automobile manufacturers we argue:
Hypothesis 1.—An organization’s hazard of mortality is a decreasing
function of its niche width.
4 Although the constructs of organizational niche and niche-overlap density are closely
associated with organizational ecology (Freeman and Hannan 1983; Hannan and Free-
man 1989; Baum and Singh 1994), they have also been used in sociological research
on networks (Burt 1993), work that combines network and ecological themes (Mc-
Pherson 1983; McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnicˇ 1992; Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan
1996), and research on social movements (Olzak and Uhrig 1999).
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Above we noted the strong connection between an entity’s niche width
and the degree to which its niche overlaps the niches of others. When an
organization broadens its niche, it cannot decrease overlaps and generally
increases them. So a complete analysis of the consequences of niche width
must take account of the excess overlap entailed by broad-niche strategies.
Our argument about the pattern of competitive intensity triggered by
niche crowding builds on ideas about localized competition (Hannan and
Freeman 1977; Barnett and Carroll 1987; Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan
1996; Han 1998) and the theory of density-dependent legitimation and
competition (Hannan and Carroll 1992, 2000). We argue that the intensity
of competition experienced by an organization in a market segment is a
positive increasing function of the number of niches it overlaps, that is,
its niche-overlap density.5
Hypothesis 2.—An organization’s mortality hazard is a positive in-
creasing function of its niche-overlap density.
Niche theory, like other first-generation theory fragments in organi-
zational ecology, deals with highly general specifications. In particular, it
assumes that the conditions that favor generalism or specialism hold uni-
versally (Carroll 1984). In the years since niche theory was developed, we
have learned about diverse forms of population and industry structure
that develop over time, as identities and positions become defined and
solidified. Hannan (1997) makes use of these arguments to argue that the
effects of density on competition (and legitimation) are intense at the early
stages of population growth when populations and industries lack struc-
ture and that they decrease in strength over time. As an industry con-
solidates in form and content, the patterns of organizational interaction
gradually become embedded in the evolving industry structure. Possibly,
in certain cases, the increase in niche-overlap density might represent the
type of syndicate and alliance formation among newly established part-
ners, rather than the clustering of potential competitors. Analyses of re-
source partitioning have also shown that relationships among specialist
entrants tend to form on the basis of symbiotic cooperation instead of
5 Not all work on competitive intensity would agree with this proposition. For instance,
some industrial economists have argued that the transition from monopoly to duopoly
has crucial consequences for strategy formation. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) show
that, for markets with three to five competitors in localized markets, the addition of
any additional competitors does not make a substantial difference. Ecologists Barnett
and Hansen (1996) show that, among Illinois banks outside of Chicago, only the arrival
of the first competitor in the town increases the focal firm’s chances of failure signif-
icantly. Their results suggest that “additional increases in the number of competitors
in a local market actually decrease failure rates” (1996, p. 153). We explored this issue
by supplementing the usual parametric analyses of the effects of overlap density with
a more flexible specification. As we describe below, we found that the effect of overlap
density is much stronger at higher densities.
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cutthroat competition. In the case of the U.S. brewing industry, for ex-
ample, the wave of entries of small niche producers (microbrews and
brewpubs) strongly resembles the coevolving mutualism typical of a social
movement (Swaminathan and Carroll 1995, p. 236). In general, the del-
eterious effect of niche crowding on survival chances ought to fade as an
industry matures (Hannan 1997).
Hypothesis 3.—The effect of niche-overlap density on an organiza-
tion’s hazard of mortality declines with industry age.
INERTIA, CHANGE, AND LIFE CHANCES
It is important to recognize that the predicted effects of niche width and
niche-overlap density do not fully reveal or account for the experiences
of all—or even most—organizations in competitive markets. For example,
rarely does a firm enter the market with a certain set of product offerings
and manage to sustain that exact same set throughout a long tenure in
an industry. Whether as a result of innovation, copying from successful
competitors, or obsolescence, product turnover is an inevitable part of
keeping in pace with industry development. As new products become
introduced and old ones abandoned, as mandates for technological com-
parability and standardization intercede with financial objectives and
limited resource availability, the line of product offerings that each firm
can bring to market might vary substantially. So for many rea-
sons—strategic, institutional, or random—the boundaries of an organi-
zation’s niche and its width likely will fluctuate. We believe that such
transitions involving change in niche width and market position have
vital consequences for the organizations that initiate them. Thus under-
standing the likely advantages and disadvantages conveyed by niche
width and market position requires that we also investigate the processes
by which organizations acquire such characteristics. We turn to this issue
next by bringing in insights from several ecological theories, including
structural inertia, resource partitioning, and organizational learning.
Do efforts to broaden or narrow the array of an organization’s tech-
nological competencies, or attempts to reposition in the market in search
of new opportunities or of a less competitive sector, affect organizational
performance and survival chances? Adaptation and selection theories sup-
ply different arguments to answer the question. The former frequently
point to the benefits that an organization can derive once the desired
transformation has been completed, whereas the latter emphasize the
difficulties associated with accomplishing the transition. Thus, the main
issue in the lingering debate between the two perspectives has centered
Resource Partitioning
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on whether the costs of implementing organizational change outweigh the
potential benefits of its outcome, or vice versa.
A body of recent empirical research has singled out several important
factors that—when taken into account—help to reconcile the adaptation
and the selection arguments. This research shows that changes in core
features of the organization increase mortality hazards, while changes in
peripheral attributes sometimes have the opposite effect. Hannan and
Freeman’s (1984) structural-inertia theory, which posits that core change
degrades structural reproducibility and hence lowers an organization’s
ability to act as a reliable and accountable collective entity, has been
confirmed in most empirical studies conducted using the appropriate re-
search design (Barnett and Carroll 1995; Carroll and Hannan 2000). Ex-
amples of studies showing that mortality hazards rise with core change
include research on several newspaper populations (Carroll 1984; Miner,
Amburgey, and Stearns 1990; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett 1993; Dobrev
1999), telephone companies (Barnett 1994), voluntary social service as-
sociations (Singh, House, and Tucker 1986), social movement organiza-
tions (Minkoff 1999), banks (Han 1998), and film-production companies
(Kim 1998, 2000).
Barnett and Carroll (1995) criticize research on this subject for failing
to distinguish between the content and the process of change. They argue
that research is most informative about the hazards of change when it
separates the effect of the characteristics of the state to which an organ-
ization is moving from the various obstacles and impediments it undergoes
in trying to get to that state. Understanding why organizations fail to
achieve the desired outcome of internal transformation or why they simply
fail, involves understanding the process dimension of change.
We define two types of organizational-level transformations, each per-
taining to position in the market. Then we decouple the content from the
process dimension in each. We begin with change in organizational niche.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit that organizations with wide product niches
will benefit from taking advantage of economies of scale, more adaptive
resource utilization, and risk spreading, but, at the same time, will face
stronger competitive pressures. These hypotheses concern states, not pro-
cesses at the organization level. Therefore, from the perspective of an
organization’s changing its niche, these hypotheses relate solely to the
content of change. Yet, implementing a substantial change in niche width
likely triggers additional unintended effects associated with change, per
se. The theory of structural inertia predicts that the process effects will
have deleterious consequences for survival chances if such changes entail
fundamental organizational transformation.
Why should this be so? The explanations concern both the organization
and population levels. The loss of established routines and practices means
American Journal of Sociology
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losing capabilities and competencies that need to be replaced with new
ones that take time to develop. The likely reshuffling of the political status
quo and the internal balance of power generates individual resilience and
inertia as well as fear of the unknown (Dobrev and Barnett 2001). Re-
lationships that rest on trust are slow to rebuild. Fundamental change
also disrupts the intra- and interorganizational networks among employ-
ees as well as between the organization and its external constituents that
act as depositories of organization-specific tacit knowledge. In short, the
process of organizational change resets the liability of newness clock (Han-
nan and Freeman 1984; Amburgey et al. 1993; Pe´li, Po´los, and Hannan
2000).
To develop and test these arguments, we need to define market position,
change in market position, and the difference between the content and
process of change. One useful way to conceptualize the social structure
of a market follows the resource-partitioning model. It construes the mar-
ket as a reflection of an intersection of dimensions capturing the distri-
butions of industry-relevant consumer preferences. The peaks of those
distributions tell us where the market center lies—where resources are
most abundant and competition is ordinarily stiffest. Market position of
an organization then can be defined in terms of its distance from the
market center, and change in market position corresponds to the difference
in that distance between sequential observations. The content of change
in this context refers to the costs and benefits associated with the position
to which the organization is aspiring to move (as contrasted with those
for the state it is leaving).
By contrast, the process dimension reveals the difficulties of actually
implementing and undergoing such a transition. The market and its center,
of course, are dynamic constructs that can also change continuously. Al-
though an organization can experience a change in its relative position
without making any changes in its own product offerings, the argument
linking the process of organizational change to increased exposure to
selection pressures and higher likelihood of disbanding would not apply
to such cases. Integrating the theory of structural inertia with the con-
ceptual differentiation between content and process change yields the
following two hypotheses predicting negative effects of process change in
niche width and in absolute market position on survival chances of auto-
mobile manufacturers.
Hypothesis 4.—Change in an organization’s niche width increases its
hazard of mortality.
Hypothesis 5.—Change in an organization’s absolute market position
increases its hazard of mortality.
Resource Partitioning
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Crowding, Learning, and Rates of Change in Organizational Niches
Another important issue in studying organizational change concerns the
ability to discern direct and indirect effects that might impact the outcome
of internal transformation. For example, in their research on Finnish
newspapers, Amburgey et al. (1993) find that organizational age has pro-
nounced effects on the rate of disbanding and on the rate of change. The
findings suggest that young organizations are more likely to change and
less likely to experience the negative repercussions of that change. Under-
standing the possible compounded effect of certain organizational attrib-
utes on internal transformation mandates analyzing their relevance for
survival chances and also the degree to which such factors influence the
propensity to implement change.
Above we argued that niche-overlap density would increase mortality
risks by stiffening competition. Yet, not all organizations fail as a result
of intensified market-segment rivalries and depleting resources. What al-
ternative strategy might such organizations pursue? To answer this ques-
tion, we turn to the resource-partitioning theory (Carroll 1985). This model
derives market segmentation as a result of strong competition for position
in the most lucrative sector of the market. The process drives industry
concentration high, as typically just a few generalists end up occupying
the market center. The rest of the competitors either fail or retreat toward
the periphery where they tend to specialize and explore untapped re-
sources. We think the transition toward the market periphery entails sig-
nificant reorganization. Whether aimed at meeting the demands of new
consumer groups or at expanding emergent specialized market segments
and creating demand by introducing novelty products, the move from a
more to a less saturated market segment likely involves both change in
market position and in niche width. So, based on the resource-partitioning
process, we expect that heightened competitive intensity not only increases
mortality hazards, but it also promotes the occurrence of internal change.
Hypothesis 6.—An organization’s likelihood of changing its niche
width and position increases with its niche-overlap density.
The management literature generally emphasizes the value of organi-
zation’s capacities to learn (Argyris 1999). Much of the sociological lit-
erature underscores the hazards and limitations of organizational learning
(March 1991; Hannan and Freeman 1989). The two perspectives, however,
are not contradictory. Organizations do indeed learn from what they do
and eventually become better at it. Their propensity to do what they have
learned and have become good at increases concurrently. This organi-
zational feature, of course, need not be construed negatively as long as
the substance of the cognitive accumulation itself constitutes the right
course of action under the prevailing environmental conditions. However,
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the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the environment and the changing
needs of the organization at each stage of its life cycle demand continuous
realignment between an organization’s strategy and its external constit-
uents. In that context, falling in a competency trap (March 1988) by relying
more on and becoming better at an infeasible course of action is a doomed
strategy that results from the mixture of past learning and inertia. We
examine possible path dependence in change processes by testing the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7.—The greater an organization’s experience with a type
of change, the greater is its likelihood of repeating the same type of change
and the lower is its likelihood of making other kinds of changes.
Organizational sociologists have pointed to a link between structural
complexity and inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Barnett and Carroll
1995). If organizations with complex structures are inherently less capable
of fundamental change, what do they learn from their experiences? As-
sume that the capacity to learn and the type of change incurred are held
constant for all organizations (regardless of the complexity of their struc-
tures). Just as we expect organizations with simpler designs to learn how
to change and to repeat the same changes that they have already survived,
this should be less true for complex organizations. In other words, we
think that the “momentum of change” declines with complexity. We do
not have a direct measure of organizational complexity. However, our
reading of the primary sources on this industry leads us to think that
organizational complexity for automobile manufacturers tends to be di-
rectly proportionate to their niche width. Based on this assumption, we
conjecture that
Hypothesis 8.—The effect of an organization’s experience with a type
of change on its likelihood of repeating that change declines with the
complexity of the organization.
Completing the Model
We agree with Barnett and Carroll (1995) that modeling internal organ-
izational change will not be complete unless the general evolutionary
trends of the industry are taken into account. So we try to account for
all of the relevant factors that earlier research on organizational change
and ecological research on determinants of rates of organizational dis-
banding have indicated to be relevant.
Previous research shows that organizational age and size have a pro-
found impact on both organizational mortality and rates of organizational
change. We introduce a measure of relative size, which makes it possible
to interpret the effects of size in relation to a reference category, namely,
the largest organization by year in the population. We use Hannan et al.’s
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(1998a) nonproportionate specification, which allows the effects of age
and relative size to interact in affecting mortality hazards.
We include a dynamic specification of the density-dependence model
where the density terms are interacted with population age to capture the
different cycles in the history of the industry (Hannan 1997; Hannan et
al. 1998b; Dobrev 2001). Following Hannan et al. (1995), we also distin-
guish between the effects of system-level (European) and subsystem-level
(country-specific) density to reveal the multilevel nature of the density-
dependence process. It posits that legitimation can diffuse the image and
identity of an organizational form across national boundaries and operates
at a broader level than competition, which is constrained geographically
within national markets.
Organizational age has also played an important role as an explanatory
covariate in previous analyses focused on the effects of change on survival
and determinants of rates of organizational change. For example, Am-
burgey et al.’s (1993) study of Finnish newspaper mortality found that
only old newspapers faced increased hazards when they attempted core
change. They also show evidence that the occurrence of organizational
change gets modified by organizational age in two important ways. First,
the rate of change decreases with organizational age, and second, the
momentum effect of prior change is more pronounced for younger or-
ganizations for one type of change, but stronger for older organizations
for another. By contrast, a study of core change and survival of social
movement organizations in the United States reports that older organi-
zations are more likely to change, while the momentum of change declines
with age (Minkoff 1999).
RESEARCH DESIGN
This research uses data on the automobile industries in France, Germany,
and Great Britain. It considers the full history of the automobile industry,
starting with 1885 and ending with 1981, the last year of full coverage
in our most comprehensive source of data. The data come from a study
that coded histories of automobile manufacturers worldwide from reports
of automobile historians and collectors.6 The most comprehensive infor-
mation comes from two encyclopedias: Georgano (1982) and Baldwin et
al. (1987). Because the sources highlight automobiles as technical products,
the resulting histories of firms pertain to spells of automobile production
not to lifetimes of the firms. These sources organize their reports around
marques, not firms. Entries for marques had to be combined to create
6 Hannan et al. (1995) and Carroll and Hannan (2000) provide details on the design.
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records for firms. The records contain information about spells of auto-
mobile production by firms but not about their complete lifetimes, which
sometimes involved operation in another industry before or after a spell
of automobile production. In some cases, the sources do tell about the
creation and destruction of the firms. Insofar as the sources permit, the
research team reconstructed the organizational histories of the firms in
these industries.
This coding effort yielded data on 828 French, 373 German, and 995
British firms. Many were small, short-lived, and obscure and left little
historical record. However, including information on such obscure or-
ganizations is crucial to sound inference about the causes of organizational
mortality. Keeping short-lived firms in the analysis means relying on in-
complete information. Therefore, we made several assumptions about
obscure, short-lived firms to allow us to include them in the analysis, as
we explain below.
Entry and Exit Events
Organizations entered automobile production by several paths, as we
noted above. Three were especially common: (1) a firm is built de novo—it
has no prior organizational experience at time of entry, (2) a new firm
results from a merger of automakers or by the division of one automobile
manufacturer into two or more firms, or (3) a firm enters from another
industry. For the obscure firms, we know only that they began automobile
production but not whether they migrated from other industries.7 This
set presumably includes both newly founded firms and entrants from other
industries. The more complete American data indicate that both types of
entry were very common.
Previous research on these populations found that the life chances of
lateral entrants and firms that arise by merger or fission of automakers
were better than those of firms that began de novo or whose type of entry
is unknown. However, using the distinction between lateral entry and
start by merger or fission did not improve model fits significantly. There-
fore, as in previous research, we use only one distinction about type of
entry in this analysis: whether a firm has prior existence of any kind
(either in the automobile industry or in some other industry). We treat
firms with unknown entry events as not having existed previously.
For ending events, the most important distinctions concern (1) dis-
7 Individual entrepreneurs surely did come from other industries, and this information
is sometimes available. However, our unit of observation is the organization, not the
entrepreneur. For us, the key distinction is whether the organization is new at auto-
mobile manufacturing.
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banding, (2) exit to another industry, and (3) merger or acquisition. Dis-
banding has an unambiguous meaning: the firm failed as a collective actor.
Exit to another industry also suggests a lack of success in automobile
manufacturing. Although merger and acquisition both result in the loss
of one or more independent collective actors, firms merge and acquire for
diverse reasons. Sometimes a firm flounders and its owners seek to recover
some fraction of their investment by selling the firm. In other cases, a
thriving firm’s competencies command great value from potential ac-
quirers or merger partners. Because of the ambiguous meaning of mergers
and acquisitions, we concentrate on disbanding and exit to another in-
dustry in this analysis (within the limits of the data, discussed next).
We also do not know exactly what happened to most firms when they
dropped from the set of producers, especially in the European populations.
This is invariably the case when spells of automobile production were
short.8 Apparently, automobile historians rarely could reconstruct the de-
tails about an exit unless a firm had become reasonably well established.
Knowledge that a certain firm disbanded, was acquired, or left the in-
dustry usually means that it persisted in the industry long enough that
its exit event received notice in the press.
As Hannan et al. (1998a) explain, “unknown exit” could be interpreted
as an ending event in its own right, governed by its own transition rate.
But, they argue against this idea. Because availability of information on
the kind of exit depends (strongly) on tenure in the industry for the Eu-
ropean populations, this analytical strategy would confound the specifi-
cation of the state space (the origin and destination states) and tenure.
They note that the historical materials suggest that most exits of unknown
type were disbandings or exits to other industries. Analysis of various
alternative treatments of the unknown-exit cases lead Hannan et
al. (1998a) to conclude that events of unknown type were governed by
processes more similar to those underlying disbanding and exit. We follow
the earlier research in treating these two events alike: the dependent
variable in this analysis is disbanding/exit to another industry, defined to
include events of unknown type. Firms known to have ended by other
events (merger, acquisition, nationalization) are treated as (noninforma-
tively) censored on the right at the times of these events.
Dating Entries and Exits
The archival sources contain varying degrees of precision in dating events.
Sometimes the sources give the exact date; other times they give only the
8 This difference shows up clearly when one calculates integrated hazards of the various
events as a function of duration (tenure in the industry). The rate of the unknown
type of exit is much higher over the early years of tenure (up to about seven years).
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month and year or season and year. Most often, they record only the year.
To make analysis tractable, all of the information about timing was con-
verted into a common metric; exact dates were represented as decimal
years. When dates were given in terms of months or seasons, decimal
years were assigned using judgments of the midpoint of the time unit.
For example, “early fall” was coded as occurring on October 15 (day 288
in the calendar), giving a decimal year value of 0.79. Dates given to only
the year were coded as occurring at the midpoint of the year.
What is normally called organizational age in the literature is, with few
exceptions, actually a measure of duration or tenure in a particular or-
ganizational population (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Tenures in auto-
mobile production can be calculated straightforwardly when dates are
exact or nearly exact. The challenging case involves entry and exit in the
same year. The data we used impose the assumption that the tenure (in
years) in the industry for such a case is bounded by 0 and 1. Such cases
are assigned a tenure of 0.5 (the expected tenure under the assumption
of a uniform distribution of events over the calendar year). Exits for such
cases are coded as occurring at (just before) the end of the year. When a
firm enters in one year and leaves in the next (e.g., a firm is reported to
have begun production in one calendar year and ended production during
the following year), we attach the starting time to the middle of the first
year and the ending time to the midpoint of the next year, giving a com-
pleted tenure of one year (which is, again, the expected tenure under the
assumption of a uniform distribution).9 These rules generalize to handle
all of the relevant cases.
MEASUREMENT
Niche Width
Adapted from the field of bioecology (Hutchinson 1957), organizational
niche theory (Freeman and Hannan 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1989)
decouples the construct of the fundamental niche—the multidimensional
social space in which an organization (or an organizational form) can
grow or at least sustain itself—from that of the realized niche, a subset
of the fundamental niche in which an organization can sustain itself in
the presence of competitors. We follow the lead of Podolny, Stuart, and
Hannan’s (1996) research on semiconductor manufacturers, which ex-
presses an organization’s fundamental niche as a function of its position
9 The general problem concerning data of this kind is known as time aggregation bias.
These procedures are consistent with Petersen’s (1991) recommendation for dealing
with this problem.
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TABLE 1
Measures of Niche Width, Market Position, and Change in
Market Position
Variable Definition
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .maxEit Firm i’s largest engine ca-
pacity at t
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .minEit Firm i’s smallest engine
capacity at t
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .maxE4t The maximum engine ca-
pacity among the four
largest firms
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .minE4t The minimum engine ca-
pacity among the four
largest firms
Firm’s niche width ( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Wit
max minE Eit it
Midpoint of a firm’s niche ( ) . . . . . . . . .Mit
min max minE  (E E )/2it it it
Change in niche width ( ) . . . . . .DW p 1it orW /W ≤ 0.9it i,t1
W /W ≥ 1.1it i,t1
Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W /W ≥ 1.1it i,t1
Contraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W /W ≤ 0.9it i,t1
Width of market center ( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ct
max minE4 E4t t
Midpoint of market center ( ) . . . . . . . .midCt  ( ) / 2
min max minE4 E4 E4t t t
Position:
Distance above market center ( ) . . .aPit
midmax (M  C ,0)it t
Distance below market center ( ) . . .bPit
midmax (C M ,0)t it
Extent of change in relative position
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .DPit (M  C ) (M  C )it t i,t1 t1
Any change in absolute position
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .aDP p 1it M (Mit i,t1
in a technological space. Specifically, we measure the niche width of an
automobile producer in terms of the spread of engine capacity over all
models that a firm produces measured in cubic centimeters (cc) in a given
year.10 (Operational measurements of niche-related measures are presented
in table 1.) Firms with a single model or more than one model with the
same engine have a minimal niche width, which we set to 1 cc to avoid
having to speak of niches of zero width. A firm that produces one or more
10 When such data were not available but we could find data on horse power, we
predicted capacity in units of cc using the coefficients of maximum (minimum) capacity
on maximum (minimum) horsepower with controls for historical periods and organi-
zational properties.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Niche Width and Niche-Overlap Density
France Germany Great Britain
Niche width (in 1,000 cc) minimum: .001 .001 .001
Max . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.37 20.0 14.3
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.87 1.85 1.14
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.06 2.24 1.46
Niche-overlap density:
Min . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 0
Max . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 106 218
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.1 28.0 53.4
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.7 21.8 47.2
models with a very small engine and one or more with a very large engine
has a broad niche by this construction.11
While the sources frequently provide information on the smallest and
the largest engine capacity models, they rarely list all of the models that
compose the firm’s set of offerings. This precluded us from constructing
a measure of number of models produced. However, our study of the data
sources leads us to conclude that firms with wide niches that produced
very few models (e.g., producing only two models: a single high-engine-
capacity model and a single low-engine-capacity model) have been prac-
tically nonexistent throughout the history of the industry. In fact, when
evidence is available, we find that the most intensely exploited techno-
logical space falls at or near the center of the firm’s niche. This justifies
our assumption that there is little, if any, unobserved heterogeneity related
to product range within firms with similar niche width. Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics on niche width for the three populations.
Measuring organizational niches along a single dimension—
technological scope, in our case—has its limitations. If our measures of
niche width and overlap density capture only market position and com-
petitive dynamics in technological space, they would be less than ideal
for testing the theoretical propositions stated in the previous section. How-
ever, we believe that our decision to define organizational niches along a
technology dimension has compensating advantages. Most important, it
provides us with a means of making meaningful comparisons of firms
that have existed in disparate historical periods, thereby allowing us to
analyze the evolution of the industry from its origins. It makes it possible
to draw as complete a picture as possible (given the severe paucity of
information for many of the entries in our data sets) of the overall market
11 Arguably, two firms with similar niche widths can differ from one another by the
number of models they produce each year.
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niches of the automobile firms whose fates we analyze. In other words,
we think that technological niches in this industry are informative about
market position. We think this is so because, upon examination, the choice
of engine capacity made by automobile producers over the years proves
to be revealing not only of the ranges of their technological offerings but
also of these firms’ strategies in product marketing and competitive pric-
ing, customer segment targeting, supply-chain management, and inno-
vation. We illustrate this point below with examples of well-known pro-
ducers from each of the three European industries we investigate.
In 1922, the renowned British automobile manufacturer Rolls-Royce
made a clear change in direction toward expanding its customer base by
offering some more affordable models with much smaller engines. In so
doing, it also appealed to a customer segment with a different social
disposition. The introduction of a smaller-engine model, nicknamed the
Baby Rolls, complemented the powerful (big engine) and also very prof-
itable model, known as the Silver Ghost. Interpreting the significance of
this strategic decision, the industry historians Baldwin et al. (1987, p. 416)
write,
Although frowned on by the purists, as such innovations always are, [the
Baby Rolls] brought Rolls-Royce motoring to a new market, not only those
who could not afford a Silver Ghost but those who did not want an enor-
mous car, or those who preferred to drive themselves.
The obvious correspondence between difference in price range and
difference in model engine capacity can be seen in the case of the legendary
German automaker Mercedes-Benz. In the depression years of the 1930s,
the company introduced the smallest Mercedes-Benz ever made until that
time, a car with a 1.7 liter engine. Its low starting price of 4,150 marks
made it the company’s best-selling model of the interwar era; more than
85,000 such cars were sold in less than a decade. At the opposite end of
the scale, we find the 7.6 liter engine model, which was
aptly nicknamed “der Grosser Mercedes.” . . . Some of the 177 first series
of Grossers were sold to anyone who could afford them (at 38,000 to 47,000
marks), but the 88 second series cars went entirely to the Nazi hierarchy
or to foreign rulers such as Joseph Stalin, Finland’s Field Marshall
von Mannerheim, Spain’s General Franco, and Antonio Salazar of Portugal.
(Baldwin et al. 1987, p. 122)
The technological range of products offered by an automobile producer
also speaks to organizational designs and internal arrangements of the
companies, as well as the resources available to them. For example, in
the post–World War I period in France, Renault’s technological niche
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ranged from a 9.1 liter engine (in an “elephantine” car), on the high end,
to the modest 0.95 liter engine of the Model KJ, on the low end. This
extremely broad scope of offerings reflected an expansion of production
facilities that allowed the company to make the supply-chain process
internal and also clearly provided a resource advantage. According to
Baldwin et al. (1987, p. 404),
As a result of wartime expansion the Renault works . . . in 1919 consisted
of 87 built up acres, including a steel foundry, . . . three iron foundries, one
aluminum and one brass foundry, general machining shops and assembly
shops for all components including bodywork. . . . In 1919 Renault acquired
its own steel works . . . the most modern steel plant in Europe.
We think these examples (only a few of the many that we came across
during the coding process) justify our reasoning in electing to focus on
technological niches of organizations, a choice that allows us to interpret
not only the range of product offerings, but also the overall market strategy
and position of the firms in our data. That said, we also suspect that the
dimensionality of niches in this industry has increased over time, as issues
such as safety, durability, fuel economy, and so forth have come into
prominence. If this surmise is correct, then our measure of the technical
niche does a better job of characterizing firms’ complete niches in the
earlier portion of the industry history than in more recent times. This
reasoning supplies another, slightly different, interpretation of the rela-
tionship proposed in hypothesis 3, which states that the effect of (technical)
niche-overlap density on mortality rates declines with industry age. By
this interpretation, the decline is due to the increasing dimensionality of
niches with industry age.
Competitive Intensity
We measure competitive intensity as proportional to niche-overlap density,
the number of organizations present in the focal firm’s niche. Table 2
provides descriptive statistics on niche-overlap density for the three pop-
ulations. Notice that the ranges are extremely broad. Each population
contains firms whose niches do not intersect any others, and they also
contain firms whose niches overlap with hundreds of other firms.
Figures 1–2 show the joint distribution of niche width and overlap
density for two time slices, 1900 and 1925, for the French population.
(The pattern for the British and German populations is similar.) Notice
that only extreme specialists (those whose niches are very close to zero)
do not experience high niche overlap. Movement away from pure spe-
cialism causes overlaps to increase very sharply.
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Fig. 1.—Niche width and niche-overlap density in the French population of automobile
manufacturers in 1900.
Position Relative to the Market Center
Recall that we want to address resource-partitioning theory’s claims about
competition in the center of the market. Ideally, we would like to use
information on the distribution of consumer tastes to identify the market
center. Lacking such information, we use information on the locations of
the four largest firms in the (national) market, reasoning that large size
can be gained in the market center. We define the range of the center as
the range between the lowest minimum and highest maximum engine
capacity among the four largest firms and the market center as the mid-
point of this range
We measure a firm’s position in the market in terms of its distance
from this measure of the market center. We distinguish between position
on the high end (i.e., producing luxury or sports model cars with high
engine capacity) and position on the low end (i.e., producing economy
models with low engine capacity). Both measures are set to zero for cases
that fall on the other side of the market center from the direction being
coded.
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Fig. 2.—Niche width and niche-overlap density in the French population of automobile
manufacturers in 1925.
Changes in Niche Width and in Position
Our measures of organizational changes reflect the important substantive
dichotomy of content vs. process that underscores our theoretical argu-
ments. We constructed a dummy variable for niche-width change that
equals one if the firm’s niche expanded or contracted by at least 10%
relative to the preceding year. We think an increase or decrease in niche
width by at least one-tenth implies a meaningful internal reorganization,
sufficient to trigger a change in the organizational core. We agree with
Podolny et al. (1996, p. 663) that “an organization might gradually adjust
its underlying technological competencies through ‘local search,’ but sig-
nificant change in position . . . demands fundamental alteration of the
organization itself.”
We use two measures of change in position. Relative change in position
is the difference in the distance of the firm’s niche center from the market
center between consecutive years. Because relative change in position
might occur without change by the organization (i.e., when only the mar-
ket dimensions are shifting), we also include a dummy variable for ab-
solute change that captures instances of change undertaken by the or-
ganization, regardless of whether such change modifies the firm’s position
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TABLE 3
Frequency of Changes in Niche Width and Position
France Germany Great Britain
N % N % N %
Spells with absolute posi-
tion change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 8.7 382 16.8 1,478 26.5
Spells with niche width
change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602 11.6 273 12.0 1,057 18.9
Spells with both changes . . . 306 5.9 193 8.5 833 14.9
Firms experiencing absolute
position change . . . . . . . . . . . 227 27.7 127 34.0 400 40.5
Firms experiencing niche
width change . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 35.4 121 32.4 362 36.7
Firms experiencing both
changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 22.5 95 25.5 281 29.1
relative to the market center. The frequency of changes in niche width
and absolute position are presented in table 3.
Organizational Size: Absolute and Relative
Research on age-varying size and life chances has conceptualized and
measured organizational size in two ways: capacity and scale of operations
(Barron, West, and Hannan 1994; Carroll and Hannan 2000). We follow
the previous research on these populations and concentrate on scale of
operations, and we measure it in terms of a firm’s annual production of
automobiles. This measure makes good sense in the context of the industry
and its history. Even analyses of the current situation focus on market
share, measured in vehicles sold. Moreover, this measure is available more
regularly than accounting measures of performance, and it is likely to be
measured more reliably in most cases.
An exhaustive search failed to uncover precise information on annual
production for most short-lived firms. Coverage is worst for France and
Germany, with precise information lacking for 81% of the firms in each
country’s industry; these account for 68% of the firm-years in France and
65% in Germany. Information on size is most complete for the British
industry, for which precise information on size is lacking for 62% of the
firms in the British industry—these firms contribute 43% of the firm-years
of observation.
Hannan et al. (1998a) argue that information about a firm’s size in-
dicates clearly that its scale was very small. The counts often come from
new vehicle registrations, which were presumably exhaustive, and from
counts of surviving automobiles. Often the sources indicate that the firm
American Journal of Sociology
1320
produced only “a few” automobiles. In others, no mention is made of the
scale of production. In both cases, a firm was coded as “small.” Sometimes,
the sources suggest that production levels were substantial, but they do
not provide exact counts. For instance, this is the case when there are
gaps in the yearly series at the end of a firm’s history and previously
reported production totals were large. In such cases, our research group
distinguished “middle size” (the firm’s production level in a year was much
higher than “small” but considerably smaller than the scale of the largest
firms in the industry at the time). In a few cases (mostly occurring during
the interwar years), it appeared that a firm’s production level approached
those of the industry’s biggest firms; size in such cases was coded as
“large.”
As in the previous research, absolute sizes are imputed to firms lacking
precise information based on the size distributions of firms whose pro-
duction levels are observed to impute sizes for the three categories. When
a firm’s yearly observation was coded as “small” and no more precise
information was available, it was assigned a value from a uniform dis-
tribution ranging from zero to the first quartile of the size distribution
for the historical period. Firm-years coded as medium and large were
assigned the second and third quartile values, respectively.
Hannan et al. (1998a) analyzed the resulting data in two ways. In one,
they merely distinguished the three size classes: small, medium, and
large.12 In the second approach, they used the natural logarithm of the
value based on the precise measures and the imputed ones. There was
little substantive difference in the results of the two kinds of analysis:
both indicated that the rate of disbanding/exit is very high for the smallest
firms and declines as a function of size. We follow the earlier research in
using the constructed metric measure of size. We measured relative size
of a firm as the ratio of each firm’s size to the size of the largest firm in
the national population at the time.
CONTROLS
We use a common population-level clock in the various analyses: industry
age. The clock for each country begins at zero in 1885, the time of initiation
of the French population of automobile manufacturing firms.13 This choice
12 For this analysis, they coded firm-years with precise information as small if the level
was below the period’s first quartile, medium if it fell in the interquartile range, and
large if it exceeded the third quartile.
13 This choice probably has little consequence for the empirical analyses, because the
dates of initiation of these national automobile industries differs by a decade at most.
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reflects the view that processes of legitimation likely spill over national
boundaries (Hannan et al. 1995).
We control for changes in institutional conditions and industry structure
with period effects, and we chose to follow the prior research on these
populations in defining historical periods.14 The analyses reported below
also contain effects of economic depression, the level of the gross domestic
product (GDP) adjusted for inflation (taken from Maddison [1991]), and
the period effects. We excluded the years of the two world wars from the
analysis because the production of motor vehicles for private use was
stopped in all of these countries.15
STOCHASTIC MODELS AND ESTIMATION
The Hazard of Mortality
Each organization in the population has some chance of disbanding/
exiting at any time during its tenure. The occurrence of such events is
controlled by an instantaneous hazard. Because we lack information on
the length of spells of prior existence for those firms that entered auto-
mobile production from other industries, the only feasible choice of or-
ganization-level clock, given our design, is tenure—the duration of the
spell of automobile production. The half-life (considering all kinds of
ending events) of an automobile producer has ranged from 1.8 years in
the British and German populations to 2.6 years in the French.
Given a random variable, that records whether a firm has dis-Y(u)
banded or exited at tenure u (in which case ) or has notY(u)p 1
( ), the disbanding/exit hazard can be defined as:Y(u)p 0
( )prob[Y(u d)p 1FY u p0]
m(u)p lim , u ≥ 0.
ddf0
(If a firm exits the population by some other event [e.g., acquisition], we
treat the spell as [noninformatively] censored at the observed event time.)
We represent the effects of changes in tenure with a piecewise-expo-
nential specification. With the breakpoints denoted as 0 ≤ t ≤ t ≤ … ≤1 2
and , there are q periods: . Wet t p  I p {uFt ≤ u ! t }, pp 1, … , qq q1 p p p1
estimate models with this general form with the method of maximum
14 Specifically, the breakpoints for Britain are those used by Torres (1995): 1915, 1919,
1939, 1946, and 1968. The breakpoints for France and Germany are those used by
Hannan et al. (1995): 1915, 1919, 1930, 1939, 1950, and 1970.
15 Firms that did not resume production of automobiles after a war (often because their
factories were destroyed) are treated as right-censored at the end of the last prewar
year.
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likelihood as implemented in TDA 6.2 (Ro¨hwer and Po¨tter 1998). As in
the prior research on these populations, we break the duration scale (in
years) at: 0.5, 1.0, 3.0, and 7.0. With this choice, the first segment
includes dated events that occur within the first six months in the(0,0.5]
industry as well as cases that enter and exit at unknown times within the
same year (as discussed above). The second segment includes dated(0.5,1]
events that occur within the second six months and cases that enter at
unknown time in one year and exit at unknown time in the next year.
The third and fourth segments are defined similarly. The final segment
begins at seven years and is open on the right.16
Our models specify that the disbanding/exit hazard is a function of
tenure in the industry (u), industry age (t), a vector of variables ( )siu
pertaining to size and prior experience (absolute and relative size and
dummies for very small size and prior organizational existence [e]),
a vector of other measured covariates ( ), including GNP, depressionx t
year, and density at founding, a function of contemporaneous density and
density-squared, as well as the interactions of these density effects and
industry age, denoted by J ( ). The key functions for assessing the ar-7
guments made above relate to niche width, market position, and niche-
overlap density, denoted by w ( ), and a function of changes in niche width7
and various measures of position, denoted by q ( ). We estimate members7
of the general class of models of disbanding/exit with the form:
′ ′( )m (u,t)p exp (m ) exp s a x p 7J(n ,t)i p iu p it t
vo( )7w nw ,n ,pos 7q(DW,DP), u  I . (1)iu iu iu p
Here denotes a set of duration-specific effects; the log-linear link im-mp
poses the constraint that the baseline hazards be nonnegative.
This kind of specification allows the hazard of disbanding/exiting to be
a nonproportional function of tenure, size, and prior experience as in
Hannan et al. (1998a). These specifications allow tenure dependence to
be negative for some size classes and positive for others. Adding effects
of niche-related measures has hardly any impact on the effects of tenure
and size. Therefore, the patterns summarized by Hannan et al. (1998a)
continue to hold. Because this issue is not central to the present analysis,
we simply report the relevant estimates without commenting further.
16 The earlier research using these data showed that the main results are fairly insen-
sitive to these choices, presumably because so few firms experience tenures of greater
than seven years.
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Changes in Position
For the other class of outcomes, change in niche width and market po-
sition, we have repeated yearly observations on firms (where the number
of observations per firm is one less than the number of years of tenure
in the industry because we use year-to-year changes). In other words, the
data structure is an unbalanced panel. Although much recent organiza-
tional research analyzes such data with fixed-effect estimators (which uses
only within-firm variation), we take advantage of a new class of robust
estimators to analyze both between-firm and within-firm variation. Spe-
cifically, we use the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE),
developed by Liang and Zeger (1986; see also Zeger and Liang 1986).
This approach generalizes quasi-likelihood estimation to the panel con-
text. Like quasi-likelihood, GEE requires specification of only the first
and second moments of the distribution of the outcome, rather than the
full distribution as is required for maximum likelihood.17 Under mild
regularity conditions, GEE estimators are consistent and asymptotically
normal.
The outcome in each firm-year is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the firm changed the relevant dimension of its niche from the previous
year and 0 otherwise. For the ith firm, we have observations; the vectorui
of outcomes can be written as: . The covariates vary′yp (y ,y , … , y )1 2 N
over firms and (in some cases) over time for given firms: Xp
, where is and the number of covariates is′(X ,X , … , X ) X (u # k)1 2 N i i
. As in the usual framework for generalized linear models, onek 1
chooses a distribution for and a link function to connect the outcomey
to the covariates. In this analysis, we obtain a (generalized) logit regression
by choosing the binomial distribution and the logit link.
We expect that the disturbance process will exhibit autocorrelation of
the usual panel type: observations for the same firm will tend to be cor-
related due to permanent and gradually changing unobserved firm prop-
erties. But, we assume that observations are uncorrelated for different
firms. GEE requires a specification of a “working” correlation matrix for
the within-organization correlation of observations. The implementation
we used—the XTGEE routine in version 6.0 of STATA (StataCorp
1999)—allows a menu of choices for this matrix. We experimented with
several, including the exchangeable correlation structure familiar from
the standard random-effects specification for panel data, as well as first-
order and second-order serial autocorrelation. We found that there is
negligible autocorrelation for the French and German data. However,
17 Barron (1992) discusses sociological applications of QL estimators (in the context of
analysis of counts).
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there is mild positive autocorrelation in the British data. For the latter,
the estimates of key substantive effects were insensitive to specification
of the working correlation matrix. Inspection of estimates suggested to us
that the “exchangeable” version fits well. For consistency, we used this
specification for all three data sets. That is, the working correlation matrix
for each organization’s observations has the following form:
1 if sp t
R(r) p .s,t {r otherwise
Finally, we based our testing on so-called robust standard errors, using
the “sandwich” estimator developed by Huber (1967) and White (1982).
RESULTS
Rates of Disbanding/Exit
Estimates of our basic specifications appear in table 4. Hypothesis 1 re-
ceives strong support: niche width has a negative effect on disbanding/
exit hazards in all three populations; the effect is statistically significant
for Britain and France. Hypothesis 2 also receives strong support: overlap
density has a significant positive effect on the hazard in all three countries.
According to these results, the worst case (from the perspective of life
chances) is having a narrow niche that overlaps substantially with those
of other organizations in the population. In other words, the highest haz-
ards are for specialists in a market center. This pattern accords well with
the central image of resource-partitioning theory.
Consider the situation from the perspective of a specialist on the pe-
riphery, one whose niche does not overlap with that of any other organ-
ization. Such an organization does not suffer the deleterious consequences
of competition within its niche, nor does it reap any of the gains of a
broad niche. Can organizations improve their life chances by broadening
their niches? The answer to this question depends upon the distribution
of organizations in the market, on the strength of the effects of niche
width and niche-overlap density, and the possibility that change per se
can elevate the hazard of disbanding/exit.
We can explore the first part of the answer by examining figures 1 and
2. Recall that movement away from pure specialism makes the number
of overlaps increase sharply. So the specialists face a genuine dilemma.
We can get a sense of the “content” effect of change for a pure specialist
by considering the multiplier of the hazard at different levels of specialism
and overlap density. We continue to focus on the French population. In
table 4, we see that this multiplier is .exp (0.06 7 W/1,000 .005 7 NO)
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TABLE 4
ML Estimates of Effects of Niche Width and Niche-Overlap Density on the
Disbanding/Exit Hazards of European Automobile Manufacturers, 1885–1981
France Germany Great Britain
Tenure in the industry:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ! 0.5 5.40 (3.81) 6.77 (5.15) 3.81 (3.63)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.5 ≤ u ! 1 5.35 (3.77) 6.41 (4.90) 3.42 (3.26)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 ≤ u ! 3 6.04 (4.26) 7.05 (5.38) 4.15 (3.98)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 ≤ u ! 7 7.81 (5.91) 14.93 (6.19) 5.51 (5.47)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ≥ 7 8.24 (6.22) 15.13 (6.32) 5.87 (5.83)
ln(GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.16 (2.39) .95 (1.28) .02 (.04)
Depression year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 (3.02) .80 (2.03) .12 (.41)
Prior existence:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ! 3 .70 (4.88) .83 (4.74) .58 (4.56)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ≥ 3 .20 (1.57) .59 (2.45) .25 (1.83)
ln(relative size):
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ! 3 1.22 (2.04) 1.63 (2.99) .98 (2.12)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ≥ 3 1.98 (3.62) 5.01 (4.82) 1.49 (3.54)
ln(size) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 (.87) .05 (.77) .04 (1.38)
Size ! 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 (3.98) .12 (.61) .67 (4.24)
Density at entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 (1.54) .005 (.85) .001 (.63)
European density ( ):NE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NE .01 (2.36) .01 (1.09) .01 (3.07)
ind. age ( ) . . . . .2N # #10E .03 (1.01) .08 (2.05) .05 (2.28)
ind. age2 ( ) . . . . .3N # #10E .003 (.58) .01 (1.90)  .005 (1.32)
Country density squared :2(n )
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 3n # 10 .22 (1.85) 3.35 (2.82) .12 (1.27)
ind. age ( ) . . . . . .2 3n # #10 .003 (.42) .26 (3.57) .01 (1.07)
ind. age2 ( ) . . . . . .2 6n # #10 .01 (.07) 4.29 (3.83) .10 (.85)
Niche width ( ) . . . . . . .3W# 10 .06 (1.92) .04 (.74) .22 (4.72)
Niche-overlap density (NO) . . . .005 (3.09) .01 (3.68) .01 (7.15)
N of spells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,171 2,272 5,582
N of events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 718 309 810
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,732.0 642.4 1,860.9
Note.—Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; u denotes tenure in the industry in years. All specifi-
cations also contain historical period effects.
This multiplier is 1.0 for a pure specialist with no overlap.18 For a pure
specialist that is unlucky enough to find itself in the center of the market,
NO might plausibly equal 100, giving it a multiplier of 1.65, meaning that
its mortality hazard is 65% higher than that of the specialist in an isolated
position on the periphery. The multipliers for center specialists in this
scenario are 2.7 for Germany and Britain (the multipliers for peripheral
18 Since we added one to all niche widths, the minimum value is actually 0.001, and
the multiplier for such a case is 1.001.
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specialists in all cases equals 1.0). Clearly specialists cannot persist in
crowded market centers.
Less evident from the parameter estimates, the hazard for most gen-
eralists also exceeds the hazard for a peripheral specialist when the center
is crowded. For instance, if a generalist experiences , then itsNOp 100
hazard of mortality exceeds the hazard for a peripheral specialist unless
its niche is extremely wide, greater than 8,333 cc, which is very far out
in the tail of the distribution (table 2). The level of niche width at which
generalism is superior to specialism for the same circumstances are 25,000
cc for Germany (far outside the observed range) and 4,500 cc for Britain
(well below the maximum but four times the mean). Suppose, in contrast,
that concentration among generalists has taken place, that all specialists
have been pushed out of the center, and that only three generalists remain
in the center. Consider a remaining generalist with cc. SinceWp 5,000
it overlaps with only two other firms, its multiplier is exp (.06 7 5
, which means that its multiplier is 25% below that of an.005 7 2)p .75
isolated specialist. These results too confirm the central intuition of re-
source-partitioning theory: it is reduced crowding in the center (concen-
tration)—not simply generalism—that improves the life chances of
generalists.
We addressed the functional form of the localized competitive effects
of niche overlap by using a nonparametric approach, replacing the log-
linear effect of overlap density in table 4 with three dummy variables
indicating overlap of 1–5, 6–50, and greater than 50 (with 0 as the excluded
category). Although the results vary among the three countries, in each
case we find that overlap density does not raise the hazards until it reaches
a count higher than 50.
We test hypothesis 3 by adding an interaction of niche-overlap density
and industry age to the models whose estimates were reported in table
4. As predicted, the estimated interaction effect is negative (and significant)
in all three populations in table 5. For example, in France, the effect of
niche-overlap density, strong at the inception of the industry, has been
eliminated entirely 50 years later in the industry evolution. Competitive
crowding and its positive effect on the hazards tend to be more pro-
nounced in the early stages of the industry evolution.
Now we turn to the process effects of organizational change on mor-
tality, net of the effects of the niche width and niche-overlap density that
result from the change. Table 5 reports estimates of specifications of the
effects of niche expansion and niche contraction by 10% or more, along
with a “change clock,” which is reset to zero whenever a firm makes either
type of change. We explored the issue of nonproportionality of these ef-
fects, and we determined that the niche-width effects vary with industry
tenure in France but not in Germany and Britain. Overall, we find that
Resource Partitioning
1327
TABLE 5
ML Estimates of the Effects of Niche Width, Overlap Density, and Position
Change on the Disbanding/Exit Hazards of European Automobile
Manufacturers, 1885–1981
France Germany Great Britain
Niche width ( ) . . . . . . . . . . . .3W# 10 .06 (2.01) .08 (1.35) .21 (4.54)
Niche-overlap density (NO) . . . . . . . . .01 (2.91) .06 (3.21) .01 (4.38)
Niche-overlap density # industry
age ( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2#10 .02 (2.02) .12 (2.53) .02 (1.95)
Change in niche width expansion:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ! 3 .33 (1.67) .53 (2.86) .03 (1.33)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ≥ 3 .22 (1.20) .53 .03*
Contraction:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ! 3 .50 (2.33) .03 (.11) .09 (.61)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ≥ 3 .27 (1.20) .03* .09*
Change clock (niche width) . . . . . . . . .03 (1.61) .03 (.75) .03 (1.33)
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,724.6 635.5 1,857.8
LR test vs. model in table 4 (df) . . . 14.8 (6) 13.8 (4) 6.2 (4)
Note.—Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; u denotes tenure in the industry. All specifications also
contain all covariates in table 4.
* Indicates that a coefficient is constrained to equal the one immediately above.
the process effects of change are positive, that is, change increases the
hazard of disbanding/exit, whenever the effect is statistically significant.
Moreover, expansion appears to be more hazardous than contraction.
Expansion elevates the hazard in all three countries, although the effect
is not significant in Britain. In addition, the effect is nonproportionate in
France: the effect is smaller after an organization’s tenure in the industry
exceeds three years. The effect of niche contraction is positive and sig-
nificant only for French firms with an industry tenure of less than three
years (such change increases their hazards by 65% according to this result).
The contraction effects are not significant in the German and British
populations.
The coefficient of the change clock tells how the hazard changes with
the time elapsed since the organization’s most recent change. Generally
research that uses specifications like ours finds that the deleterious effects
of change erode over time. This pattern is usually termed negative du-
ration dependence. This is not the case in the populations we study. In
contrast, we find positive (but not significant) duration dependence in
each case.
Table 6 reports estimates of an alternative representation of the effects
of change, looking at change in market position. These specifications,
which include effects of measures of market position and change in market
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TABLE 6
ML Estimates of an Alternative Specification of the Effects of Niche
Width, Overlap Density, and Position Change on the Disbanding/Exit
Hazards of European Automobile Manufacturers, 1885–1981
France Germany Great Britain
Niche width ( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3W# 10 .004 (.10) .01 (.14) .17 (3.14)
Niche-overlap density (NO) . . . . . . . . . . .01 (2.50) .06 (2.91) .01 (3.67)
Niche-overlap density # industry
age (# ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 .03 (2.23) .12 (2.38) .03 (2.53)
Change in niche width:
Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 (.38) .29 (1.23) .32 (2.23)
Contraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 (.81) .30 (.88) .30 (1.84)
Change clock (niche width) . . . . . . . . .06 (.97) .02 (.28) .002 (.05)
Position:
Distance above market center
(# ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 .04 (2.58) .02 (.96) .01 (1.76)
Distance below market center
(# ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 .004 (.77) .01 (1.27) .001 (.20)
Change in relative position (DP#
) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 .01 (1.19) .04 (2.10) .001 (.22)
Any change in absolute position
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .aDP p 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ! 3 .65 (4.31) .43 (2.21) .95 (7.66)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u ≥ 3 .32 (1.73) .43* .34 (2.11)
Change clock (absolute change) . . . .03 (.53) .06 (.68) .04 (.65)
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,711.1 627.9 1,824.9
LR test vs. model in table 4 (df) . . . . . 41.8 (10) 29.0 (9) 72.0 (10)
Note.—Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; u denotes tenure in the industry. All specifications also
contain all covariates in table 4.
* Indicates that a coefficient is constrained to equal the one immediately above.
position, also separate the effects of process and content change.19 It ap-
pears that in the European automobile industries, being a “high end”
producer has been a beneficial position. The coefficient capturing distance
of a firm’s niche center above the market center has a negative effect on
the hazard; the effect is significant for the French and British populations.
In France, for example, a company whose production centers around a
model that is more powerful than the most sought after generalist model
by 1,000 cc reduces its hazard of disbanding/exit by about a third.
The effect of relative position change—change that does not necessarily
involve organization-level transformation—is significant only in Germany,
where the estimated effect implies that the hazard drops by about 30%
if a firm repositions its niche center by 1,000 cc (i.e., whenever a firm’s
19 To further investigate the effect of change in relative position, we allowed the effect
to differ by direction (i.e., toward vs. away from the market center), but this distinction
was not justified by the results.
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“average” car becomes more similar or dissimilar to the “average” gen-
eralist car by an engine capacity difference of 1,000 cc). So, it appears
that, while in France and Britain being a high-end specialist confers an
advantage, the real benefit in Germany came from constant exploration,
even if it was incidental.
Paradoxically, as the next set of results indicate, exploration generally
comes at a very high cost and proves beneficial for life chances only as
long as it is incidental. The estimates for the effect of absolute change
(change that, regardless of its direction, involves repositioning by the focal
firm) are positive and highly significant in all three countries. In France
and Britain, these effects are also nonproportionate; they are much
stronger for firms with less than three years of tenure in the auto industry.
In Britain, such firms are 2.6 times more likely to fail, and they are 1.9
times more likely to fail in France. Once their industry tenure surpasses
three years, those disadvantages decline to a level at which they increase
the hazard by about 40% in both countries. In Germany, the absolute
change effects increase the hazard by roughly one half, irrespective of
tenure. In France and Britain, where the absolute change effects hinge
on tenure, the initial hump in mortality disappears to reveal monotonic
negative tenure dependence. Overall, the results in tables 5 and 6 provide
strong support for hypotheses 4 and 5.
Summarizing the main results presented so far, we note two sets of
effects that stand out as robust and consistent across the three populations
of automakers. Both competitive crowding and organizational change (its
process dimension, in particular) significantly elevate mortality hazards.
Earlier we also argued that a possible second-order (indirect) effect of
competitive crowding might heighten mortality hazards by increasing the
propensity of firms to initiate change. To test this proposition, we now
consider estimates of models of the rates of change in niche-width and
(absolute) market-position.
Change in the Niche
We report results for change in the center of the niche in table 7, which
reports GEE results for the panel data on change. Overlap density has
a positive effect on the propensity to change. The effects are highly sig-
nificant for France and Britain but not Germany. The effects in the French
and British populations are strong in substantive terms as well. For in-
stance, a French firm’s log-odds of absolute position change is 112%
higher when it overlaps with 75 firms as contrasted to the situation in
which it has no overlaps. In Germany, the log-odds of change at NOp
is 35% higher than with no overlaps. So, in accord with hypothesis 6,75
we find evidence that competitive intensity not only increases mortality
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TABLE 7
GEE Estimates of Pooled Logit Regression Models of (Any) Change in
Absolute Position by European Automobile Manufacturers, 1885–1981
France Germany Great Britain
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.97 (1.36) 1.07 (1.64) .24 (.51)
Tenure in the industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 (.86) .01 (.45) .09 (6.41)
Depression year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 (.57) .28 (.85) .25 (1.13)
ln (GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 (1.41) .25 (.46) .46 (1.40)
Prior existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 (1.21) .37 (2.28) .04 (.35)
ln (relative size) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 (.51) .09 (.52) .49 (2.68)
ln (size) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .05 (.50) .07 (.81) .0002 (.006)
Size ! 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 (1.27) .04 (.16) .29 (2.15)
% niche width ( ) . . . . . . . . . . . .3W# 10 .02 (.23) .11 (1.56) .08 (1.50)
% niche-overlap density (NO) . . . . . . . . .01 (4.12) .01 (1.21) .004 (3.09)
N of prior changes in niche width . . . .75 (3.81) .93 (2.50) .39 (5.94)
Distance above market center
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2#10 .12 (1.14) .05 (2.51) .02 (3.20)
Distance below market center
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2#10 .01 (1.13) .01 (2.05) .002 (.94)
N of prior changes in absolute posi-
tion (NPC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.74 (6.01) 1.37 (3.26) .29 (6.70)
NPC # tenure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 (3.71) .01 (4.32) .003 (4.76)
NPC # niche width . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 (1.13) .05 (2.19) .02 (2.19)
N of observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,171 2,272 5,582
N of firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 373 987
Wald x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309.90 105.45 223.09
Note.—Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; all specifications also contain historical period effects.
Scale parameter p 1; df p 18.
directly, but it also does so indirectly by increasing the rate of organi-
zational change in two of three populations studied.
Our hypotheses concerning learning and inertia hold that greater cu-
mulative absolute-position change will trigger subsequent changes in ab-
solute position but will deter change in niche width. Support for the first
part of this proposition is strong; the estimates in table 7 show that ex-
perience with the same change has a strong positive effect on the pro-
pensity to change further. Additionally, consistent with earlier studies
examining rates of organizational change (Amburgey et al. 1993; Minkoff
1999), we find that the momentum of change declines with industry tenure.
We also find support for the proposition that experience with one type
of change deters the occurrence of another type of change. Cumulative
niche-width change has a significant negative effect on the rate of position
change in all three countries.
Our final hypothesis predicts that the effect of previous changes on the
likelihood of repeating the same type of change declines with niche width
(regarded as a measure of complexity). The estimated effects of the product
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of niche width and number of prior changes in position on the propensity
to change position are negative, as predicted, for only two of the three
populations, and the effect is only significant for the German population.
Effects of Other Covariates
To this point, we have focused on the effects that bear directly on our
arguments. However, we embedded these effects in a model that specifies
effects of size, industry tenure, density, and several environmental cov-
ariates. Several of these effects deserve note. First, adding the effects of
niche width and niche-overlap density do not change the pattern found
earlier without these effects (Hannan et al. 1998a). The hazards of dis-
banding/exit decline with relative size and increase with industry tenure,
and the effect of each depends upon the level of the other (the effects are
nonproportional). In particular, there is positive age dependence for small
firms and negative age dependence for large ones.
One set of findings, concerning the dynamic multilevel specification of
density dependence, is new. The theory of multilevel density dependence
holds that different levels of population density drive legitimation and
competition. Modified to account for the nonsymmetric effect of popu-
lation density at different stages of the industry evolution (Hannan 1997),
the model, in the form specified here, posits that the baseline density effects
(low counts increasing survival through legitimation and high counts in-
creasing mortality through competition) reverse direction as an industry
structure evolves and solidifies. But resurgence in density in the late cycle
of industry evolution again reverses the direction of effects to the original
pattern. This account is consistent with the resource-partitioning story
explaining the late surge in population density with the proliferation of
specialists on the market periphery.
This model has previously been estimated for founding rates but has
not, to our knowledge, been applied to mortality rates. The results in table
4 offer strong support for the predictions of the theory. Looking at the
main effects of density, we see that Europe-wide density has a negative
effect on mortality rates and (the square of) country density has a positive
effect. These results agree with the view that legitimation processes flow
more easily over national borders than do competitive processes. Looking
at the interactions of these effects with industry age, we see that, with
the exception of the interaction between the squared terms of industry
age and country density in France, the legitimation and competition effects
have the predicted directions for all three countries.
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DISCUSSION
The findings of this research expand our knowledge of the processes
investigated by three well-developed and empirically tested theory frag-
ments: density dependence, resource partitioning, and structural inertia.
Our results help to establish conceptual links that integrate these theory
fragments into a coherent research stream similar to the Mertonian type
of theory of the middle range, thus further consolidating the broad knowl-
edge base accumulated within the ecological framework of organizational
analysis.
Our contribution to density dependence here lies in elaborating the
multilevel form of the model. Similar to models of locally partitioned
density-dependence, we describe a process that could be termed “niche-
localized” density dependence.
At the core of our argument lies the assumption that a process of
constitutive diffusion of a new product resembles the legitimation of a
new organizational form. A single organization can rarely carry out the
institutionalization of a new line of products or services. That many com-
panies are willing to invest in and pursue an emerging market domain
provides a sign that inspires trust and confidence in potential customers
and partners alike. The presence of more than one actor in a market
segment also reflects positively on the status of early entrants.
Clearly, the transition from monopoly to duopoly poses constraints on
access to resources and introduces a competitive relationship. But, at low
levels of niche-overlap density, the disadvantages posed by the entry of
competitors is minimized; indeed our results suggest that they are neu-
tralized, by the subsequent entrants’ contribution to affirming the identity
of the new product. Growth in local density also aids in defining, ex-
panding, and fortifying the boundaries around the evolving market niche.
This line of reasoning agrees with the implication of the resource-parti-
tioning model that the flattening of the resource distribution over time
results from the entry of specialists whose arrival promotes the consoli-
dation of new market niches and changes consumer tastes.
We find that there is a threshold level in niche-overlap density, above
which niche crowding heightens mortality. Virtually all ecological studies
that have analyzed the distribution of population density over time report
a similar pattern: density increases, slowly at first, and then at a higher
rate until it reaches a peak followed by a decline. This decline in the
number of organizations can be explained (at least partly) by the higher
exit rate of existing firms that fail in the competitive process once the
limits of the population’s carrying capacity are reached.
We find that this effect might also be indirect. Our findings suggest
that competitive crowding propels organizations to change their niche
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widths and positions. When this happens, organizations can change their
strategies to those that seek to find a viable position outside of the market
center, a process that leads to resource partitioning. But, change in range
of product offerings and in location proves to have vital consequences.
Organizations that attempt such change suffer increased exposure to en-
vironmental selection. So, it appears that density dependence breeds re-
source partitioning; that is, competitive crowding also has an indirect
effect on mortality by decreasing the survival chances of organizations
exploring less competitive market segments, a process that gives rise to
the formation of peripheral niches with thinner but untapped resources.
The resource-partitioning model predicts that market segmentation and
rising concentration improve the survival chances of specialists, but this
model does not specify how specialists come to proliferate outside the
market center. Our findings, however, imply that the survival advantages
associated with location on the periphery might hold only for new market
entrants, because the deleterious effects of changes in niche width and
position might offset those advantages. This is especially true in light of
our finding that the hazard of failure due to niche width and position
change does not diminish with time. So it seems that the specialist ad-
vantage comes at the cost of becoming a specialist—a finding that un-
derscores the importance of separating the effects of content and process
change when studying organizational transformation.
Organizational change is precarious partly because of the difficulty of
foreseeing the amount of related subsequent structural transformations
that will be induced by an initial change (Barnett and Carroll 1995). Until
all such changes are completed, the organization is unfit to operate at its
previous levels of accountability and reliability. In other words, a “re-
covery” period follows nontrivial transformation attempts. During this
period, the process consequences of organizational change are hard felt.
In this research, we found no evidence that an actual recovery from the
negative impact of process change is certain to occur. On the contrary, it
appears that once structural inertia triggers liability to selection, this effect
is continuously perpetuated and amplified with time.
We believe that our approach to defining organizational strategy along
the generalist—specialist dimension by using technological niches of or-
ganizations can be explored and refined in future research on resource
partitioning. Variance in organizational niches can be used to complement
measures of size and product characteristics (e.g., content coverage in
newspapers), frequently used to capture this distinction in previous anal-
yses. The effects of industry concentration, for example, can be tested on
the subset of narrow-niche organizations, or those located outside the
market center. Similarly, the proposed scale-based selection mechanism
that accounts for consolidation among generalist organizations (Carroll
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and Swaminathan 2000; Dobrev and Carroll 2000) can be applied to
organizations with wide niches. Overall, the use of the niche construct
can be useful in explicating the intricacies in the relationship between
organizational size, strategy, and resource partitioning (Dobrev, Kim, and
Carroll 2001).
The research presented here points to the variety of ways in which the
niche construct could be exploited in other research fields. Our findings
about the negative relationship between niche change and organizational
survival, for example, can be extended to the sociological investigation
of collective action in an interesting way. For instance, Olzak and Uhrig
(1999) suggest that it is helpful to think about the niche of a social move-
ment in terms of its tactical repertoire and routines for organizing, which
eventually become embedded in the movement’s identity. Relying on the
content/process distinction, one can test if the “fade-away” of social move-
ments occurs when a movement attempts to broaden or diversify its tac-
tical array. Even though new tactics might become more appealing to
members, more socially acceptable, and thus more effective than old ones,
the transition to different routines and tactics itself might imply that the
movement’s identity has been lost, that it has been debauched, coopted,
or defeated. More broadly, much sociological analysis rests on assumptions
about embeddedness and structure. Defining and measuring the niche
along dimensions and attributes of individual and collective social actors
could yield the conceptual utility and the research versatility needed to
investigate the dynamic relationship of persons and organizations to their
positions in the social structure.
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